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Abstract 
The South China Sea has long been regarded as one of the key potential flashpoints for conflict in the 
Asia-Pacific, alongside North Korea and Taiwan. Recently tensions have been on the rise and relations 
between China and the other South China Sea littoral states have become more fraught – characterised 
not only by diplomatic claim and counter-claim (though frequently framed in less than diplomatic 
language) but also, more worryingly, by confrontations at sea. 
Context, as they say, is everything. This article briefly outlines geopolitical drivers that sustain these 
complex and seemingly intractable disputes, and seeks to shed light on their international legal 
dimensions. It suggests that China in particular has been driven to adopt extreme positions in order to 
secure access to what Beijing tends to regard as its proper share of the resources, especially seabed 
energy reserves, of the South China Sea. However, such resources may not, in fact, prove to be the kind of 
panacea for regional energy security concerns that they are sometimes perceived to represent. 
Nonetheless, if present trends are sustained, further incidents are highly likely. Before proceeding to 
assessment of those issues, a brief consideration of the disputed South China Sea islands is in order. 
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AND THE ‘OIL FACTOR’ 
IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA
by Clive Schofield
__________
THE SOUTH CHINA SEA has long been regarded as one of  the key  potential flashpoints for conflict in the Asia-Pacific, 
alongside North Korea and Taiwan. Recently  tensions have been on the rise and relations between China and the other 
South China Sea littoral states have become more fraught – characterised not only  by  diplomatic claim and counter-claim 
(though frequently framed in less than diplomatic language) but also, more worryingly, by confrontations at sea.
Context, as they  say, is  everything. This article briefly  outlines geopolitical drivers that sustain these complex and 
seemingly  intractable disputes, and seeks to shed light on their international legal dimensions. It  suggests that China in 
particular has been driven to adopt extreme positions in order to secure access to what Beijing tends to regard as its 
proper share of  the resources, especially  seabed energy  reserves, of  the South China Sea. However, such resources 
may  not, in fact, prove to be the kind of  panacea for regional energy  security  concerns that they  are sometimes perceived 
to represent. Nonetheless, if  present trends are sustained, further incidents are highly  likely. Before proceeding to 
assessment of those issues, a brief consideration of the disputed South China Sea islands is in order.
Dangerous Ground
The South China Sea disputes tend to focus on possession of  several groups of  islands, sovereignty  over which is 
contested among multiple claimants. Remarkably, for all of  the attention devoted to the disputed South China Sea islands 
over the years, some uncertainty remains over their geographical characteristics.
Looking at a map of  the region, the key  island groups in the South China Sea are,  clockwise from the northwest: the 
Paracel Islands (disputed between China and Vietnam), the Pratas Islands (administered by  Taiwan but,  inevitably, 
claimed by  China also),  Scarborough Reef  (or Shoal) together with Macclesfield Bank (contested between China and the 
Philippines) and the Spratly  Islands group (see Figure 1).  The Spratly  Islands are claimed in whole or in part  by  no few 
than six states or entities (in the case of  Taiwan) – Brunei, China, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. With 
the exception of Brunei, all of these claimant states occupy and garrison at least one of the disputed features.
Accordingly, the Spratlys Islands represent  the primary  point of  contention among the South China Sea littoral states. The 
Spratlys group comprises around 150-170 islands, islets, rocks, reefs, shoals and low-tide elevations. That different 
authors offer different  figures regarding precisely  how many  Spratly  Islands there in fact are, is testament to the 
bewilderingly  varied character and types of  insular features in question. This complexity  has tended to lead to 
disagreement over which features to count, resulting in different figures.  The Spratlys also have different names in 
multiple languages, including Chinese, English, French, Malay,  Filipino and Vietnamese as well as variants within these 
languages,  adding a further problematic dimension to the equation. For convenience this essay  refers to the most 
commonly used English names of local features.
The Spratly  Islands are uniformly  small, isolated and uninhabited save for garrisons of  occupying troops and government 
personnel.  The tiny  dimensions of  the Spratly  Islands is underscored by  the fact that the largest, Itu Aba (Taiping Island), 
occupied by  Taiwan,  is a mere 1.4km long and 370m wide, with an area of  approximately  50 hectares. Indeed, a review 
of  hydrographic  records suggests that as few as 36 of  the Spratly  “Islands” are actually  above water at high tide. 
Collectively  these features have an estimated total area of  less than 8km2 (3 sq. miles) scattered over approximately 
240,000km2 of the southern South China Sea (Figure 1).
The Spratly  Islands are therefore almost vanishingly  small specks of  territory, in a broad swath of  ocean space semi-
enclosed by  the surrounding mainland and main island coastlines of  the littoral states. Indeed, for most of  their history  the 
Spratlys have been known as places to avoid because of  the dire threat to the safety  of  navigation that they  pose, rather 
than as the highly  desirable real estate that  they  have become. This is  well illustrated by  the fact that on British Admiralty 
charting, the area now commonly  known as the Spratly  Islands group has traditionally,  and aptly, been labelled 
“Dangerous Ground”.
All the more remarkable,  then, that these seemingly  insignificant and intrinsically  worthless features are the cause of 




As at least some of  the Spratly  Islands are indeed above water at high tide, they  constitute land territory,  no matter how 
small, that can be subject to sovereignty  claims on the part of  surrounding coastal states. Such territorial claims are 
notoriously  hard to reach compromise on as they  instantly  engage with a core state interest: safeguarding territorial 
integrity. Such disputes are readily  hijacked by  nationalists, leaving extremely  limited leeway for dispute resolution – a 
situation that, arguably, works to the advantage of  governments keen to bolster legitimacy  and popularity  and prepared to 
do so by appearing firm on territorial and border issues.
The Spratly  Islands are located in close proximity  to sea lanes which are vital to the generally  resource-poor and thus 
import-dependent major economies of  East and Northeast Asia. In particular the South China Sea forms an important 
part of  the sea lane of  communication (SLOC) carrying seaborne energy  supplies from the Middle East, Africa and 
Australia. The military  significance of  the installations on the Spratlys  has also been touted in this context. That said, 
shipping tends to avoid rather than sail through the disputed islands, which remain hazards for navigation. The military 
worth of  small bands of  troops garrisoned on the disputed islands is also militarily  questionable save perhaps for their 
role as listening posts.
It  is noticeable, however,  that many  sovereignty  disputes over small, sparsely  inhabited and far-flung islands, including 
those of  the South China Sea,  have only  manifested themselves in the post-World War II period,  as extended claims to 
maritime jurisdiction became more prevalent. That such tiny  features may  have the potential to provide the basis for 
broad maritime claims offers a seductive additional dimension to the sovereignty  disputes over them. This is particularly 
the case given strong, though not necessarily  well-founded, presumptions that the ocean spaces associated with these 
disputed features contain valuable marine resources, especially seabed energy resources.
Two factors suggest that the ‘oil factor’ in the South China Sea disputes tend to be overplayed. The first of  these relates 
to the international legal status of  the disputed islands –and thus their capacity  to generate extensive maritime claims or 
significantly  influence the course of  future maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. The second concerns the 
existence (or non-existence) of  South China Sea hydrocarbon resources themselves, and their likely  impact on the 
regional energy security picture.
 
When is an island a Rock?
The islands are often regarded as the key to the South China Sea disputes, not only  because the disagreements 
represent  the primary  source of  contention among the littoral states but also because they  are viewed as having the 
potential to generate extensive claims to maritime jurisdiction and thus offer access to a significant prize in terms of 
marine resources. Such broad maritime claims would, however, only  result if  the disputed features were actually  capable 
of  generating such extensive maritime claims and, crucially, were awarded full weight in the delimitation of  future 
maritime boundaries in the South China Sea. Both of these propositions are open to question.
All of  the South China Sea states with the exception of  non-UN member Taiwan are parties to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of  the Sea (UNCLOS). Article 121 of  the Convention articulates the “regime of  islands” in 
international oceans law. In accordance with UNCLOS an island is defined as “a naturally  formed area of  land, 
surrounded by  water, which is above water at high tide”. In principle the maritime claims made from islands should be 
determined in the same manner as for “other land territory”. Islands can therefore be used as the basis for advancing 
claims to a 12 nautical mile broad territorial sea as well as continental shelf  and exclusive economic zone (EEZ) rights 
out to 200 nautical miles.
There is an exception to the rule, however.  Article 121, paragraph 3 provides for a disadvantaged sub-category  of 
islands, formally  termed “rocks”, that are incapable of  supporting human habitation or an economic life of  their own. Such 
features “shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf”. This represents an enormous disadvantage in 
terms of  capacity  to generate claims to maritime jurisdiction. Thus, if  an island had no maritime neighbours within 400nm, 
it could generate 125,664 sq.nm [431,014km2] of  territorial sea, EEZ and continental shelf  rights as compared to the 
capacity of a “rock” to generate a territorial sea claim of 452 sq. nautical miles (1,550km2).
Great volumes of  academic ink have been expended in the quest for clear distinctions between islands, capable of 
generating continental shelf  and EEZ rights, and mere rocks, which cannot.  To little avail. Such efforts have proved futile, 
as Article 121, paragraph 3 was drafted in a deliberately  ambiguous manner in order to satisfy  competing, indeed 
diametrically  opposed, positions and interests among the drafters of  UNCLOS. This provision of  the Convention is, as a 
result, open to radically differing interpretations in order to enable consensus on a particularly controversial issue.
Clearly  at least some of  the disputed features of  the Spratly  Islands remain above water at high tide. At first  glance many 
of  these would, however, seem to most readily  fit  the description of  rocks. There is, though, no way  to be conclusive on 
this  point  because Article 121 of  UNCLOS lacks an objective test.  Some of  the claimant states, notably  Malaysia and 
Vietnam, have indicated that they  are of  the view that the disputed islands should be treated as rocks and therefore 
generate territorial seas of  no more than 12 nautical miles. If  all the claimant states were to accept this position, the 
maritime area in dispute would shrink significantly. It is clear,  however, that China does not agree. It has stated in explicit 
terms that it not only  possesses “indisputable” sovereignty  over the disputed islands (despite the palpable reality  that 
such disputes do indeed exist),  but also that the islands are capable of  generating the full suite of  maritime zones, 
including EEZ and continental shelf rights.
Even if at least some of the Spratly Islands are, in fact, capable of generating EEZ and continental shelf claims, there is 
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Figure 1: Competing Maritime Claims in the South China Sea
little reason to anticipate that they  would necessarily  give rise to jurisdiction over broad maritime spaces on behalf  of 
whichever coastal state is ultimately  deemed to hold sovereignty  over them. The putative delimitation of  maritime 
boundaries is  between small, isolated features among the Spratly  Islands, on the one hand, and the long mainland and 
main island coasts surrounding them, on the other.
There is significant disparity  in the length of  relevant coasts under such a scenario. It is highly  unlikely  that the disputed 
islands would be accorded full effect in the delimitation of  a maritime boundary. Indeed, there is a growing trend 
internationally  of  small islands, especially  those that are remote, sparsely  inhabited or completely  uninhabited, and which 
possess restricted coastal fronts, being awarded only  limited impact on their respective maritime boundaries. Instead, 
they have often been awarded only territorial sea rights as though they were indeed mere rocks.
Temptations and illusions: 
the “Oil Factor” in the South China Sea
There is a strong, long-standing perception of  the South China Sea as a major potential repository  of  seabed oil and gas 
resources.  It  is a view not well supported by  evidence. The South China Sea’s reputation as an oil rich region arises in 
part from a fervent desire on the part of  interested parties for this to be the case, and tends to be perpetuated through 
misinterpretation of oil reporting terminology and a general lack of reliable data.
All of  the South China Sea states face increasing energy  security  concerns. The rapid industrialisation of  East and 
Southeast Asian economies has led to sharp, and ongoing,  increases in demand for natural gas and petroleum-derived 
products.  At the same time many  of  the countries concerned are facing stagnating or declining domestic oil and gas 
production leading to growing reliance on imported energy  resources to meet the gap between supply  and demand. Of 
the six direct parties to the South China Sea islands disputes, China, the Philippines and Taiwan are already  strong net 
importers of  oil while Malaysia and Vietnam are on the cusp of  becoming net importers.  While Brunei Darussalam 
remains a net exporter of  oil, on a global or even regional scale it is  not a major player. Enhanced energy  security 
concerns have created a compelling incentive for these states to seek sources of  supply  ‘close to home’. This has made 
claimants extremely  reluctant to concede any  potential source of  supply  falling within the scope of  their  own potential 
jurisdiction, such as may underlie disputed parts of the South China Sea.
Estimates of  the hydrocarbons resource potential of  the South China Sea vary  wildly. As a direct consequence of  the 
existence of  the island disputes and overlapping maritime claims, very  little exploration work, such as 3D seismic surveys 
or exploratory  drilling, has been undertaken. As a result, estimates tend to be restricted to geology-based assessment 
methodologies,  and are necessarily  highly  speculative – something that helps to explain why  such estimates vary  so 
much. Geology-based assessments have their limitations, but can offer useful guidance. In particular, they  can indicate 
areas where it is  highly  unlikely  that oil and gas will be found, such as the broad swath of  the central South China Sea to 
the north of  the Spratly  Islands, which is underlain with oceanic crust. There are key  geological ‘play  elements’ necessary 
for the formation of  oil reservoirs: the presence of  a highly  porous and permeable sedimentary  reservoir, organic rich 
source rock, and a low permeability  seal or capping rock. While these geological conditions are required for oil to be 
present, they  offer no guarantee that oil will, in fact, be found. There are several areas of  the southern South China Sea 
which are geologically  most attractive and apparently  prospective. These include the peripheral parts of  the South China 
Sea where sediment thicknesses are generally  greater, localised areas of  favourably  thick tertiary  sediments to the East 
of  the Spratly  Islands group (e.g. the Reed Tablemount), and some relatively  thick sediments distributed over areas to 
the Southeast and West.
Crucially, estimates also tend to be loosely  defined, often as a consequence of  poor understandings of  proper oil 
reporting terminology. In particular there is frequently  a lack of  distinction between estimates of  resources versus 
estimates of  reserves. Resource estimates, are estimates of  the volume of  oil in situ in the ground.  Reserve estimates 
are the proportion of  the resource that can be recovered in light of  technical feasibility  and market price. For example, for 
a frontier field a reserve estimate may  equate to only  around 10 per cent of  the overall resource estimate.  Many 
estimates also fail to distinguish between the hydrocarbon resource types (conventional oil, unconventional oil, natural 
gas,  gas hydrates) under discussion. All of  these factors  lead to confusion and tend to inflate the potential significance of 
South China Sea seabed energy resources.
In this context it is worth noting that the South China Sea is generally  considered to be predominantly  gas-prone. While 
the region’s oil resources remain a speculative quantity, East and Southeast Asian states are,  in fact, comparatively  rich 
in gas resources.. But there are considerable limitations on the potential for gas to be used as a substitute for oil, and 
there are significant  transportation challenges associated with recovery  and movement of  gas deposits.  In combination 
these factors undermine the business case for the development of  South China Sea hydrocarbons resources.  This is 
especially  so for gas resources in light of  declining gas prices globally, at least in part as a consequence of  the ongoing 
rise of  shale gas. Finally, the considerable time lag between discovery  and delivery  of  “first oil” has to be factored in, This 
is yet another complicating element that has to be balanced against the realities of  seabed energy  resources and a 
political context governed by  seemingly  intractable multilateral disputes over ownership,  and escalating regional energy 
security  concerns. Governments and investors alike should therefore treat with a healthy  degree of  caution any 




In recent times Chinese maritime surveillance and enforcement agencies have undertaken a number of  troubling 
activities in waters close to the coasts of  Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. These have included 
enforcement  activities related to fisheries jurisdiction, as has been done with respect to waters that Indonesia considers 
part of  its EEZ, as well as interventions to disrupt Malaysian, Philippine and Vietnamese oil and gas survey  and 
exploration activities in those states’ respective coastal waters.  Further, in June 2012 the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) issued tenders for oil concessions in close proximity to the Vietnamese coastline.
All of  these interventions and incidents have taken place in waters closer to the mainlands (or main islands) of  the 
surrounding coastal states than to the disputed South China Sea Islands.
Even the provision of  “maximum effect” – the claim to maritime zones based on the construction of  a strict, equidistant 
line between the surrounding mainland coasts and the disputed islands – would be inadequate (and dubious) justification 
for Chinese enforcement activities. Instead, for all of  its repeated assertions that its claims are “clear” and “indisputable”, 
China’s actions appear to be sustained only  by  questionable historical claims. The most notable example of  this is its 
infamous nine-dashed line claim, the exact meaning of  which has never been officially  explained and remains opaque; it 
is now depicted graphically  as a map embedded in Chinese passports, much to the chagrin of  neighbouring South China 
Sea states.
Arguably  China has been driven to adopt these positions, the “hard place” alluded to in the opening lines of  this article,  in 
order to sustain claims to the more prospective parts  of  the South China Sea: areas in the vicinity  of  the islands 
themselves,  and peripheral parts of  the Sea in close proximity  to the shorelines of  other South China Sea states, where 
substantial depths of  sediment (and therefore oil) exist.  China’s increasingly  pressing energy  security  concerns provide 
a backdrop and strong incentive in this regard. Further drivers underlying China’s position are its long held sense that it 
has been poorly  served by  predominantly  Western-inspired international law and treaty  relations, as well as frustration 
that  despite its own long coastline, China’s  maritime claims are constrained and hemmed in by  its regional neighbours 
and their competing claims. In contrast, the other South China Sea claimants fundamentally  reject any  Chinese claim to 
what  they  regard as their rightful offshore, coastal maritime spaces. These states appear intent on exploiting the 
resources that their adjacent waters may  offer, not least  because they  face their own energy  security  imperatives. In light 
of  China’s increasing propensity  to flex its  new-found maritime muscles in precisely  these same areas, the scene 
appears set for further frictions and confrontations in the Sea, especially over access to marine resources.
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ECONOMIC NATIONALISM IN ASIA
by Kit Dawnay
__________
NATIONALISM (rarely low) is up in Asia.  Disputes over islands, fisheries, oilfields, visits to shrines and even national 
dances are the current mainstay of regional press coverage. Manifestations of patriotism in Asia are nothing new, and 
have long sat along a continuum varying from acceptance to extreme resistance. The nastier forms of nationalism 
demand attention, though.
One notable example has been anger expressed in Chinese streets at Japan’s purchase of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands 
in September 2012. This violent nationalism derives in part from China’s Patriotic Education Campaign, introduced in the 
wake of the Tiananmen massacre, and at times its adherents show a fascist tinge.  Of similar concern is the stance 
espoused by Japan’s more nationalist politicians.  Worrying, then, is that extreme rhetoric will rise as the 16 December 
elections in Japan draw near, raising the risk of tensions, perhaps even an accidental conflict between two of Asia’s great 
powers. 
Less violent expressions of nationalism, such as those defined through economic regulation, are also on the increase. 
They appear less egregious. It is not easy to identify when economic regulation shifts from being a reasonable, if 
burdensome, regulatory tool to something prejudicial. But as any investor would attest, the distinction is crucial.
Two current examples have arisen, in Mongolia and Indonesia. 
In Mongolia, people have gained little from a resources boom; they still live in “gers” (traditional tents) and scrape a 
living. Accordingly, politicians claim a desire to apportion some mining company earnings to the people, an ostensibly 
laudable aim. A tax increase for mining businesses, a new strategic investment law, and efforts to force major 
companies, such as Turquoise Hill, a subsidiary of mining giant Rio Tinto, to renegotiate contracts, all seem justified, 
then.
Similarly in Indonesia, a mining boom has encouraged politicians to pass laws obliging companies to build smelters near 
plants, thereby adding to local jobs, and to hand their interests to an Indonesian counterparty ten years after investment. 
The government has also restricted certain foodstuffs, and is channelling imports through particular ports, ostensibly so 
as to build local capacity and improve social conditions.  
However, a nefarious motive often underlies these noble ends. In Indonesia, many measures favour the interests of 
powerful businesses, such as those controlled by the Bakrie family or by presidential hopeful Prabowo Subianto. 
Similarly, in Mongolia, nationalist ministers often turn out to be involved in the sector in question. Vested interests thus 
subvert measures, orchestrate their introduction, or rely on them to assist in seizing assets.  Either way, unless states are 
careful, the rules come to favour only local robber barons.
A related fear is that economic nationalism can be self-defeating. Take coal. It is demand for coal in China that has led to 
much investment and has emboldened Ulaanbataar. Mongolia became China’s biggest supplier of coal in 2011 (sending 
in some 43% of its imports), and expanded production from about 10 million tonnes in 2008 to nearly 20 million tonnes in 
2011. Its industry, moreover, is still nascent.   
Shifting policy to take account of demand seemed wise, even if it is actually quite risky. The first difficulty is that 
Ulaanbataar’s tough stance towards investors relies on the assumption that China’s fast growth will continue as before, a 
belief increasingly questioned. Indeed, the US Conference Board’s Global Economic Outlook published projections in 
November 2012 that Chinese GDP will grow only 6.9% in 2013, falling to 5.5% from 2014 to 2018.  The lack of demand 
in China’s export markets, such as the European Union and the US, shows little sign of picking up. 
A second, longer term concern is the shale gas revolution, which may ease pressure on energy markets. The US is now 
a major gas supplier. Russia is also claiming huge shale reserves, as have Canada and China. Coal, and, thereby 
Mongolia, may be the loser. Should prices fall, Ulaanbataar’s longer term prognosis may appear based on a top of the 
market calculation, and the country may be misguidedly risking its relationship with the investor community.
For their flaws, though, these nationalisms have a purpose. They tie individuals and groups together, and unify territories 
disparate in language, geography and culture. But at what stage do they become self-defeating? Is it when they are 
hijacked by corrupt oligarchs to further their interests, or is it when they provoke a war?
Nationalism is not organic, after all. It is built by governments or groups with particular agendas, and is usually defined in 
opposition to something or somewhere. And, as Doctor Johnson would have it, it remains the refuge of scoundrels – in 
Asia today, as in Georgian England.  
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THE DICTATORSHIP OF CIVIL SOCIETY 
IN TAJIKISTAN
Faisal Devji | OXFORD DIARY
The fall of  the Soviet Union gave rise to a narrative about 
the “transition” to democracy, for which the concept of 
civil society  was seen as being foundational. 
Represented by  new-fangled NGOs on the one hand, 
and on the other by  more traditional religious or 
economic institutions, civil society  was meant to establish 
peace in post-Soviet  societies by  limiting the reach of  the 
state and indeed politics in general,  seen as the source 
of  conflict and violence there. I want to argue here that 
the reverse is actually  the case. Civil society  in its post-
Cold War incarnation,  which is very  often funded from 
abroad, serves both to prevent the establishment of 
democratic  politics, as well as increase the risks of 
conflict and so the possibility of violence.
What  the idea of  civil society  does in the post-Cold War 
period is to depoliticize the “people” in whose name it 
claims to speak. For unlike in its  republican conception, 
the people’s role is  no longer revolutionary,  to found a 
new political dispensation. It is meant rather to limit 
politics either in a libertarian or neoliberal way. Unlike the 
role it had played from the nineteenth century  and late 
into the twentieth, civil society  is not seen in liberal terms 
today. It is no longer supposed to make politics possible, 
because this would require the prior constitution of  a 
people in some kind of  explicitly  political, if  not 
necessarily  revolutionary  way. In fact the people can only 
be invoked by  or in the name of  the state, which also 
recognizes the presence of  conflict and even enmity 
within it.  That the people should be divided and possess 
enemies is crucial to its existence as a political entity.
What  would it mean to be a people without the possibility 
of  conflict and in the absence of  a state? Outside this 
political context the people possesses no meaning, with 
any  claim to represent it as a whole echoing the equally 
preposterous one made by  dictators who rig elections in 
which they  are endorsed by  99% of  voters. Without the 
state and its institutionalization of  conflict, in parties and 
parliaments,  violence comes to mark social relations in a 
way  that can lead to civil war. On its own civil society  is 
unable to found a new politics, only  to protest against an 
old one. Whether it is the Occupy  movements in Europe 
and America, or the more successful Arab Spring, civil 
society  activism can at most dislodge governments but 
never constitute them. And this means that it is 
condemned eventually  to offer up the people to the state 
in a kind of sacrifice.
I shall take as my  example of  this sacrifice the recent 
violence in a region of  Tajikistan inhabited by  an ethno-
religious minority. Previously  known after their 
mountainous homeland as Pamiris, this group is today 
increasingly  identified by  the purely  sectarian name of 
“Ismailis”. The change in designation, which disconnects 
Pamiris  from a local and indeed national politics to link 
them with a transnational and apolitical religious identity, 
came about as the devastating civil war in Tajikistan was 
drawing to a close in the late 1990s. At that time the 
Ismaili spiritual leader – the Aga Khan,  based outside 
Paris – averted a humanitarian catastrophe by  having his 
NGO, the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN), 
provide food and other forms of  relief  in the region where 
his followers lived.
The role played by  the AKDN in Tajikistan’s Badakhshan 
province represented a victory  for the “neutrality” of  civil 
society  in a sensitive region, preventing as it  did the 
direct  intervention of  the UN, NATO or any regional 
power in a potentially  “separatist” area located on the 
Afghanistan border. But despite its good work during the 
decade and a half  in which it has dominated the area, the 
AKDN has come no closer to effecting a “transition” to 
democracy  there, let alone in the country  as a whole. 
This  is due to the nature of  civil society  activism itself, 
more than to the peculiarities of  Tajikistan. For the 
AKDN’s “success” was due entirely  to the weakness of 
Tajikistan’s new government, with the autonomy  of  its 
civil society  activism compromised with the regime’s 
stabilization, and especially  once Russia and the US 
started competing for influence and military bases there.
In July  this year Tajikistan launched a large-scale and 
entirely  unexpected military  incursion into this technically 
autonomous region. Ostensibly, the move was about 
arresting former rebels who had been granted amnesty 
after the civil war, and who were apparently  involved in 
drug trafficking and violence across the Afghan border. 
Vastly  disproportionate to its apparent cause, this 
deployment resulted in the killing of  at least twenty 
civilians and the assassination of  a number of  former 
rebels.  Given that the AKDN had taken on the role of  a 
state in its provision of  services and employment over the 
past  decade, these events in Badakhshan constituted a 
direct  attack on its influence and left its reputation there 
in tatters. Indeed it may not be an overstatement to 
suggest that the AKDN was as much the target of  the 
incursion as were the former rebels. But what could be 
more predictable than the attempt of  a state to regain 
control of  its territory, even if  only  to secure a share in the 
trafficking profits that seem to have bypassed 
Dushanbe?
With a naïve faith in its  own resources and international 
connections, especially  in the West,  the AKDN had in 
effect destroyed its own bargaining position with the Tajik 
regime,  not only  by  urging the disarmament of  former 
rebels,  but also by  dismantling the structures of  local 
authority  in Badakhshan. Tying “development” there to an 
unrepresentative organization run and funded from 
abroad, the NGO set itself  up as the chief  spokesman for 
the Pamiris with the state, through the Aga Khan’s 
“Resident Representative” in the capital of  Dushanbe. 
This  process of  dismantling local authority  was also 
extended to the cultural and religious life of  Badakhshan, 
with arbitrary  changes made in leadership, ritual and 
doctrine. It was all done in the name of  efficiency, the 
same reason given for the AKDN’s unrepresentative 
model of  development.  Their poverty  has allowed the 
institutions of  Pamiri religious as much as economic 
authority  to be transferred into the hands of  strangers in 
Europe.
The Tajik state no doubt appreciated the truly  “efficient” 
way  in which the AKDN, and the Ismaili religious bodies 
that it informally  supported, deployed their political 
neutrality  and resources to depoliticize the Pamiri 
population and speak on its behalf,  purely  in the 
language of  development and civil society.  Yet the 
AKDN’s influence and foreign connections would also 
have worried any  government concerned with its 
sovereignty  and territorial integrity. In the process the 
Pamiris, who had long been a regional majority  and a 




entity  – were quickly  being transformed into a 
transnational religious movement.  And this only  allowed 
them to be attacked as traitors and religious deviants 
with access to funds and assistance from abroad.  And 
indeed, despite i ts wholesome reputat ion for 
development,  the absorption of  Pamiris into a non-state 
organization like the AKDN put them in the same 
structural position as more sinister movements of 
transnational militancy, some of  which have also adopted 
a civil society model. 
Having helped to save Pamiris from violence, pestilence 
and famine during the civil war, the AKDN, together with 
the Ismaili religious organizations that shadow it,  ended 
up making them more vulnerable to attack. This is partly 
due to their entering into what appears to be an informal 
pact  with the government, in which the latter is allowed to 
have its way  while the AKDN and its religious shadows 
engage in murky  financial and other transactions. A 
number of  the Ismaili religious bodies, for example, seem 
to have no official existence in Tajikistan, though the 
funds they  receive from abroad appear to be transmitted 
by  the AKDN, even though its role is not meant to include 
this  kind of  support. These organizations then hire 
Pamiris  who, in violation of  Tajik law, possess no 
recognized employment status or identification,  and can 
therefore be picked up at  any  time by  the state’s security 
agencies.
In addition to the uncertain tax implications involved in 
such arrangements, they  guarantee the quiescence and 
loyalty  of  Pamiris. Unlike the expatriates who run the 
AKDN and its religious outliers, for instance, Pamiris are 
often kept for years on short-term consultancy  contracts 
with no benefits such as pensions or health insurance, 
making them vulnerable to the state as much as to their 
employers,  who can dismiss them at will for any  reason 
at all. Their loyalty, in other words, is bought by  insecurity 
as much as gratitude for the employment given them as 
a favour. However necessary  these arrangements may 
be thought to be in a post-Soviet  context, they  also end 
up making the NGO sector dependent on the state and 
complicit  in its actions. For the AKDN and its satellites 
require the government’s favour to engage in such 
dealings in the same way  as they  dispense favours to 
others.
Tied as they  are in a relationship of  co-dependency, in 
which the state is increasingly  coming to dominate civil 
society, the AKDN has itself  become a threat to the 
security  of  Pamiris, partly  because it appears to confuse 
its  own protection with that of  the people it  claims to 
represent. In the wake of  July’s violence,  for example, 
neither the AKDN nor any  Ismaili religious body  has 
issued any  public statement condemning the state’s 
actions or,  indeed, giving Pamiris any  instructions or 
advice, apart from demanding their further disarmament. 
Given the rumours of  another attack by  Tajik forces, this 
silence by  the “neutral” institutions of  a foreign-funded 
civil society  works only  to prevent a resolution to the 
problem brought  to light  by  the violence this summer. So 
a letter recently  sent to the Aga Khan by  a number of 
Pamiris, an electronic copy  of  which I received over 
Skype from some of  the authors in Dushanbe, contains 
the following plea:
We are deeply  concerned about the lack of 
responsibility, empathy  and participation of  the 
leaders of  the National Council who, according to 
community  members, do not attend community 
meetings when invited by  the people through the 
local khalifas, stating that they  must remain neutral in 
such a situation […].  We are confused by  their 
response and are at  a loss--whom can we turn to in 
such a dire situation that affects the lives and 
securities of  all jamati members? We feel that the 
unwi l l ingness of  those appointed as your 
representatives,  either in the AKDN or the jamati 
institutions, to engage with, advise or instruct 
members of  the community, is  a dereliction of 
leadership and responsibility  that  is deeply 
demoralizing. We have heard no word about the 
progress of  any  negotiations or the planning for any 
contingency  in the uncertain political atmosphere of 
Tajikistan, and this can only  increase the anxiety  of 
your murids.
The passage quoted above is from the second letter 
sent  their imam by  some of  the signatories. They  had 
received not a word of  response, no doubt for legal and 
diplomatic reasons, to a first letter sent to the Aga Khan 
late in August. At that time demonstrators had peacefully 
taken to the main square in Khorog, asking for its council 
to convene and legalize the gathering so that protestors 
could demand the army’s withdrawal as well as the 
resignation of  the provincial leadership for acquiescing in 
its  violation of  Badakhshan’s autonomy. The head of  the 
Aga Khan Foundation in Tajikistan, however, persuaded 
them to rely  upon the informal negotiations that he and 
others were conducting with the government. While 
leading eventually  to the army’s replacement by  the 
secret service, the agreement reached seems not to 
have addressed popular concerns, and those supporting 
the demonstrators continue to be harassed and 
arrested. The important thing to note about this event, 
however,  is  that it made clear the fundamentally  anti-
political attitude of  Badakhshan’s “civil society” 
institutions,  which worked to dissuade people from 
acting as citizens and institutionalizing conflict in the 
political process. Surely  if  there was any sign of  a 
transition to democracy  in post-Soviet Badakhshan this 
was it, but such a move would threaten the ability  of  the 
AKDN to speak on behalf of Pamiris.
The AKDN, of  course, together with the Ismaili religious 
bodies (known as jamati institutions) linked to it, are 
most likely  involved in extensive behind the scenes 
negotiations with the government and other parties in 
order to secure the protection of  the Pamiri population. 
This security  they  probably  think will only  be 
compromised by  demonstrations and demands, but the 
question to ask is how responsible these civil society 
organizations might have been for the violence whose 
repetition they  are now working to prevent? The authors 
of  the letter to the Aga Khan are clear about the fact that 
the non-availability  of  political action, or rather its 
forestalling by  the AKDN, together with the latter’s own 
secrecy  and silence, may  well encourage a self-
destructive resort to arms by some young Pamiris:
We do not  wish to hide from you the rumors that 
some of  the younger members of  the Jamaat have 
identified a weapons supply  lines and are arming 
themselves as we speak, preparing themselves for 
the new offensive, and although they  lack experience 
of  warfare, many  of  them do not wish to act as 
passive observers to the unjust attack, and we 
therefore are concerned that the repercussions of 
this  offensive will end in greater loss of  human life. 
[…]  We, your spiritual children, feel helpless and 
scared right now, as we prepare ourselves for 
another attack. Unless something is done, we 
foresee a large number of us taking up arms to 
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physically  defend our land and community, while 
others are forced to leave the country.
Recognizing the fact that the AKDN and its associated 
“jamati institutions” have become the mainstays of 
Badakhshan’s subservience, the Tajik government now 
flaunts its patronage of these organizations.  The 
President  claims to have made their operations possible, 
and newspapers report that permission for the Aga Khan 
to visit  his followers might be withdrawn for his own 
security  given prevailing conditions. In other words the 
institutions of civil society are being held hostage to 
guarantee the good behaviour of Pamiris,  thus acting as 
a brake on their autonomy and political development. 
Facing the prospect  of being humiliated before their own 
clients,  who have until now been fed with unrealistic 
stories about the wealth and power of the Aga Khan, 
these institutions are not likely to do anything more than 
submit ever more unctuously to government decrees, if 
only in order to maintain their authority  over the Pamiri 
population and continue the work of development which 
is somehow meant to lead to freedom. The fact that 
TCELL, the mobile phone company partly owned by the 
Aga Khan, ceased working during the army action in July 
and for a couple of months afterwards, is already being 
seen as a sign of civil society’s capitulation to the state,
in a move damaging to the AKDN as a whole.
This  is the conclusion to which the supposedly smooth 
and efficient provision of services, achieved by the 
elimination of political rivalries, is inevitably driven. 
Politics cannot be avoided and must  be engaged with, a 
fact that the transitory power of the AKDN and its form of 
civil society had only obscured over the last decade. 
Fractious though it may always have been, Pamiri 
society  had at least  possessed its own forms of cultural, 
religious and other authority even in the Soviet past. But 
their fragmentation and transportation abroad in the era 
of global civil society activism have done nothing more 
than limit the possibility of social integrity and political 
agreement  in Badakhshan. Pamiris must realize that  in 
some ways the AKDN and its religious satellites need 
them more than the reverse,  since the profile and 
credibility of these institutions would be severely 
damaged without a role to play in Tajikistan. The task 
before them is therefore to take control of such 
institutions while at the same time participating in political 
life under their own name, and not as part of  Ismailism’s 
“frontierless brotherhood”. In no other way can a 
transition to democracy, even if only at a provincial level, 
ever be achieved in Tajikistan.        
OBAMA’S ASIA PIVOT: BETWEEN 
SOME ROCKS AND A HARD PLACE
Jon Western | THE QUIET AMERICAN
As tensions persist between China and Japan over the 
disputed islands in the East China Sea,  the United States 
faces the almost impossible task of simultaneously 
reassuring and constraining its regional allies, while 
ensuring that it does not escalate its own tensions with 
Beijing.   On one level it is hard to see how China and 
Japan could become so consumed over a small set of 
remote islands and it  remains unclear how serious the 
crisis is.  Yet,  over the past several months, Chinese and 
Japanese ships have been patrolling the same waters 
with both laying territorial claims to the area.  And,  earlier 
this  fall, U.S. Defense Secretary  Leon Panetta warned 
that  the escalating tensions and close proximity  of 
Chinese and Japanese vessels could lead to some 
triggering event and conflict.
The island dispute,  however, is only  a small part of  the 
much larger geostrategic dance and set of  regional 
challenges associated with China’s rise.  In September 
2012, The Economist wrote that all sides see their 
posturing as part  of  the future power alignment in the 
region: 
The islands matter, therefore, less because of  fishing, 
oil or gas than as counters in the high-stakes game 
for Asia’s future. Every  incident, however small, risks 
setting a precedent. Japan, Vietnam and the 
Philippines fear that if  they  make concessions,  China 
will sense weakness and prepare the next demand. 
China fears that if  it fails to press its case, America 
and others will conclude that they  are free to scheme 
against it.[1]
Washington has not taken a position on the sovereignty 
of  the islands, but it has publicly  announced that the 
islands fall within the commitments of  its mutual security 
agreements with Japan.  Nonetheless, Japan, South 
Korea, and other U.S. allies remain anxious.  One cause 
for concern is China’s assertiveness. The other is 
potential U.S. global retrenchment in the face of  its 
internal debt and decade-long wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   In the absence on a comprehensive 
regional security  framework, the United States has long 
played the role of  regional balancer by  providing its allies 
with an extensive set of  bilateral security  arrangements. 
With America’s current debt burden, public exhaustion 
with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and continued 
sluggish economic trends at home, uncertainty  about 
America’s commitment and overall strategic posture is 
creeping into the discussion.  Many  in the region worry 
that  America’s  departure from Afghanistan in 2014 might 
lead to a retrenchment from global responsibilities,  in a 
fashion similar to that which followed the American 
withdrawal from Saigon in 1975.
High levels of  uncertainty  about China’s future have also 
exacerbated concerns about the future of  American 
power in East Asia.  It has been widely  projected that 
China will continue to rise and may  overtake the U.S. 
economy  in the next half  century.  This led to a number of 
claims and concerns about the potential for conflict 
during this  anticipated hegemonic transition or 
hegemonic parity. 
Today, however, there are now increasing signs and 
worry  that China will not keep up the same pace.  While it 
may  eventually  reach and surpass the size of  the U.S. 
economy, China faces a number of  in terna l 
contradictions and challenges. Projections suggest that 
growth rates are likely  to hover between six and eight per 
cent rather than the 10 and 12 per cent rates sustained 
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over the past two-and-a-half  decades. China’s high 
domestic  savings rate and low domestic consumption 
rate create extensive dependency  on exports.  The 
government is under intense pressure to ensure 
adequate job growth to absorb new migrants.   And in at 
the beginning of  a new leadership transition, the 
Communist Party  is under pressure to control corruption 
and widespread economic criminal activity.
Longer-term trends suggest even greater challenges. 
Despite China’s impressive economic gains, the shear 
size of  its population means the country’s per capita 
GDP is still well below the world average -- just above 
US$5,000 per year.  Even if, or when, its aggregate 
GDP catches up to that of  the United States, it  will 
continue to face much higher levels of  inequality  than 
found in the West.   Furthermore, a number of  social 
challenges are looming that will create significant  long-
term fiscal pressures.  China’s population is aging with 
nearly  30 per cent of  its population projected to be over 
the age of  60 by  2020.    It currently  does not have a 
comprehensive social security  system to provide levels 
of  care and support for this aging population once they 
leave the workforce.  Likewise, environmental 
degradation and the associated affects  on public health 
have not been addressed.   The government has 
deferred efforts for comprehensive reforms on all of 
these fronts.   But, it is clear it will need to address them, 
and they will require significant fiscal outlays.
All of  this will put increasing pressure on the Communist 
Party  and threaten its legitimacy and control.  If  history  is 
any  judge, we may  well see greater regional and global 
aggressiveness both to demonstrate its power and 
deflect domestic dissent. 
This  is the context of  America’s current “pivot” to Asia. 
Thus far, the Obama administration has redeployed a 
modest number of  naval assets to the region.  It also has 
publicly  confirmed that  the disputed islands fall under the 
mutual defense treaty  with Japan and that the United 
States would side with Japan in any  dispute.  Yet, unlike 
Europe, the region is not well institutionalized to help 
manage diplomatic or security  challenges.   A recent 
study  from the London School of  Economics warned, for 
example, that ASEAN has little capacity  to cope with a 
significant conflict between Washington and Beijing.
This  puts a much greater burden on Washington to 
develop a more comprehensive strategic posture.  In a 
recent  study, the Washington-based Center for Strategic 
and International Studies concluded that thus far the 
United States has fallen short. It argued:
The top priority  of  U.S. strategy  in Asia is not to 
prepare for a conflict with China; rather, it is to shape 
the environment so that such a conflict  is  never 
necessary  and perhaps someday  inconceivable.  It 
is therefore critical that the United States can 
achieve and maintain a balanced combination of 
assurance and dissuasion to shape the environment.
[2]
Identifying and reaching that delicate “balanced 
combination” is not going to be easy, given the dynamic 
nature and interconnectedness of  events in the region, 
and the fluidity  of  perceptions and uncertainty  about the 
future of  U.S. and Chinese power in the region. 
Nonetheless, this is really  the only  viable approach, and 
the island dispute does demonstrate that is now time to 
think much more comprehensively  about how to avoid 
escalating conflicts, and ensure long-term stability  in 
East Asia.
NOTES
[1] “Can Asia Really Go to War Over These?” The Economist, 
September 22, 2012.
[2] “U.S. Force Posture Strategy in the Asia Pacific Region:  An 
Independent Assessment,” Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, Washington D.C., July 27, 2012.
THE FUTURE OF INFORMAL 
ECONOMIES
Scott Smith | DISCONTINUITIES
Economists,  anthropologists and other social scientists 
have spent the past three decades probing, sizing and 
documenting so-called informal economies— from the 
structures and behaviors of  deviant subcultures and 
black markets to informal production and labor dynamics. 
More recently,  technologists, designers and social 
innovation experts have taken notice of  these 
unstructured, unofficial, “unseen” economies as future 
growth sources and incubators for innovative practices. 
This  past October,  I  was fortunate enough to speak at the 
Informal Economies Symposium in Barcelona organized 
by  design group Claro Partners, where representatives 
from all of  these groups came together to kick off  a 
macro examination of  the subject. The goal of  the event 
was to improve understanding of  the relationship 
between informality  and formality, and to discern what 
the nature of  this relationship can teach us about where 
global economies are headed.[1]
Our collective exploration started with Keith Hart,  the 
anthropologist who himself  coined the term “informal 
economies” in a seminal paper on labor in Ghana written 
for the International Labor Organization in 1973.[2] Hart’s 
insights anchored subsequent talks and panel 
discussions.  Informal economies were probed  from 
multiple angles, by  design and social innovation thinker 
John Thackara; strategic designer Richard Tyson; design 
strategist Niti Bhan,  who has studied so-called “prepaid” 
economies in India and Africa; Steve Daniels of  IBM and 
Makeshift Magazine, whose graduate research focused 
on “maker” economies; and a number of  other 
technolog is ts ,  soc ia l innovat ion exper ts and 
entrepreneurs.
Against  the backdrop of  resurgent informality  in Spain 
itself  (the result of  seriously  ailing local and global 
economies),  the discussion was rich with reflection on 
recent  experiences in the field, problems with current 
“casual” thinking about informal economies, and open 
questions about how informality  impacts the prospects 
for our own economic and social design. Throughout the 
day, speakers shared field and research lab experiences 
alike.  The symposium was exploratory  and inquisitive 
rather than declarative. As the putative inception stage of 
a longer process of  discovery,  it fused together 
disciplines and insights, and set us on a path toward 
greater understanding of the role of informality.
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Hart’s opening call asked us to rethink how we define 
informality, particularly  as the” formal/informal pairing”, as 
he calls it,  was shaped both by  the polarities of  the Cold 
War, and later fragmentation of  the economic order that 
the global industrial powers had sought to impose after 
World War II. For Hart, this “we/they” construct has 
become increasingly  meaningless. The global economy 
has blurred the lines between formality  and Informality, 
leading to a growing informalization of  the global 
economy, to use Hart’s own phrase (for more on Hart’s 
thinking, see his blog, The Memory  Bank).[3] As with 
many  of  the day’s discussions, Hart  focused partly  on the 
role of  money  in the formality/informality  dynamic, 
pointing out that  it, and therefore labor, became 
ungovernable after the oil shock of  the 1970s. Add 
technology  to this formula, as has happened in the past 
decade,  and the shape and flow of  informal economies 
look more like what we now think of  as the formal. 
Formal definitions of  work, commerce, innovation,  and 
organization, in what we consider the formal and the 
informal, are increasingly  indistinguishable, Hart told us. 
As such, we should focus on how to bridge formality  and 
informality, instead of  thinking of  them as separate, 
oppositional spheres.
Richard Tyson, whose work with Caerus Associates 
focuses in part of  systems design in frontier markets,  and 
Adam White of  Groupshot, who works in social 
innovation, focused on the need to “map” informal 
economies at a high level and understand how they 
relate to traditional systems. Informal economies are 
often understood endogenously, they  argued, but to 
understand them exogenously, from the outside, we need 
to interact with them (interdict  if  necessary), manage the 
risks they  present themselves and the larger world. 
Better definitions are needed, they  pointed out. However, 
both suggested in different ways that strict codification of 
informal economies is more harmful than not. Tyson 
emphasized the need to establish flexible systems and 
frameworks for understanding them, particularly  in a 
state of  what he called “permanent crisis” created by 
formal sector breakdown. Now would be a good time to 
better chart  how they  work, Tyson said, as the emergent 
power structures of  groups creating greatest tension for 
the formal sector, such as insurgencies in the Sahel, are 
coded by the dynamics of informal economies.
A separate panel on the role of  money  in informal 
economies really  turned to the subject of  flexibility—how 
much of  it exists, and needs to exist, within modern 
economies.  Here, Hart’s  point regarding the change to 
post-gold standard money  flows: what we think of  as 
flexibility  in the formal economy  is  really  just money  and 
economies systems working in a natural state, not 
behaving according to some artificial freedom.
Within informal economies, money  is situational. As Niti 
Bhan pointed out in her talk on prepaid economies, even 
something as “formal” as the iPhone ends up being 
converted,  in an informal situation,  to local currency  that 
make sense locally  (like an equivalent value in, say, 
goats). We are only  now beginning to (re)recognize how 
many  forms money  takes in the formal world, and as a 
result, we are pushing its boundaries and templates with 
everything from mobile payments to time banks and 
barter systems in depressed economies such as Spain 
and Greece.
The final talks focused on where future opportunities 
might  be found. Steve Daniels of  IBM and Makeshift 
showed his ongoing research on the extent of  innovation 
within informal economies. Many  of  his examples were 
particularly  striking in the way  they  underpin the 
resilience needed for survival — they  are incredibly 
efficient and show levels of  resourcefulness we 
historically  haven’t had to develop in resource-rich formal 
economies.  A tour through New York City,  newly  battered 
by  Sandy, reminds us how well we would do to relearn 
these approaches in our own formalized lives. Tim Brown 
flipped this theme around and showed how Chinese and 
Taiwanese “Shanzai” culture has informalized massively 
formal cultures of  technology  development (something 
I’ve covered previously  in the pages of  this bulletin here).
[4]
My own talk concluded the day. My  intent  was to inspire 
thinking about a possible future where the informal and 
formal come together on a local scale, to focus on 
sustainable,  functional innovation.  I  argued that this is in 
the process of  happening right now as the remaining hulk 
of  the formal economy  slowly  composts into a large-scale 
informal economy, increasingly  functioning on 
foundations – through communications networks, and 
open software and hardware, for example – that we 
presume to be purely formal.
Growth is problematic in a world of  finite physical 
resources and limited ability  to absorb the byproducts of 
endless growth. So is resilience, which too often 
becomes a defensive strategy. Rather than try  to 
recapture either of  these, I proposed we refocus on 
functional innovation as a lesson from informal 
economies,  building what we need, when we need it, in 
ways that are locally  sustainable. Bookending Hart’s  call 
to break down the barriers between formal and informal, I 
posited that this is where we increasingly  stand, in a 
zone of  traffic between the two demarcated by 
disappearing boundaries. Only  those with a stake in 
keeping such boundaries intact seem to notice.
NOTES
[1] Abby Margolis, “Notes on the Informal Economy 
Symposium,” theinformaleconomy.com, October 19, 2012, URL: 
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OBAMA’S CHRISTMAS WISH LIST AND 
NEW YEAR RESOLUTIONS
Stephen Saideman | XENOPHILE
Being re-elected President of  the United States was a 
pretty  nice gift, but  what else could President Obama 
want  for Christmas?  What would I like to see him 
promise to do more or less of in the New Year? 
If  I  were Obama, the first thing I  would ask for would be a 
foreign policy  team as strong as his  first  one.  Hilary 
Clinton will be tough to replace, and Leon Panetta is not 
as strong in a time of  defense budget cuts as Robert 
Gates could have been.  Already, there has been much 
discussion about this, with Susan Rice dropping out and 
Chuck Hagel under fire.  The risk of  appointing Kerry  is 
more about losing the Senate seat he occupies.  Thus 
far, there has been far less speculation about the 
Department  of  Defense.  A great but most unlikely 
gift would be a Republican Party  with a bit of  a learning 
curve.  Sure,  the Democrats would be better off  in 2014 
and 2016 with the Republicans of  today  as their 
opponents, but Obama is done with re-elections and 
would like to get some stuff  done.  A reasonable 
Republican Party would be an amazing gift.
If  Santa were super-generous, Obama could wish for a 
bit more peace in the Mideast, starting with a a magical 
solution to the Syrian civil war.  The Middle East is the 
Land Of  Lousy  Alternatives for American foreign policy. 
Syria presents a tremendous challenge, given that the 
US public is exhausted by  a decade of  war, that the 
Syrian opposition is hardly  united and includes many 
folks the US would rather not  arm, that Russia and China 
have very  conflicting preferences, and so on.  Perhaps 
Assad will fall off  a horse.  A more likely  but still not quite 
probable gift would be a multilateral deal with Iran.  The 
sanctions are biting hard, but Obama would want a deal 
negotiated by  the coalition representing the international 
community.  Unfortunately, Obama cannot return the 
earliest  gift—more violence between Israel and Hamas. 
This  is exactly  what he didn’t want for Thanksgiving or 
Christmas or anytime.
Of  course, as the Beatles suggested,  the love you take is 
equal to the love you make.  So, Obama is  probably 
shopping right now for a chill pill for China.  The rising 
power has been testing and pushing its neighbors.  A 
less assertive, more cooperative China would be a gift to 
the entire region.  Perhaps Obama will give Vladimir 
Putin a new exercise machine for his  abs, so that Russia 
focuses on building inward strength rather than serving 
as a spoiler.  On the other hand, both countries’ 
reluctance to allow NATO the freedom to do in Syria 
what  it  did in Libya is probably  a gift to Obama, who 
would prefer to avoid yet another intervention in the 
wider region. 
The winter season is not just for gift giving and receiving, 
but also making resolutions to do better in the New Year. 
So, what should Obama resolve to do or not do,  besides 
giving up smoking?  He should definitely  try  to keep the 
US at or under the number of  wars it  is currently  fighting. 
He should resolve to rely  less on drones as a hammer 
for every  foreign policy  problem.  He should try  to 
advocate less on austerity  as a solution for everyone’s 
economic problems.
I think the most important resolution for the American 
public would be to make counter-terrorism less 
extraordinary.  A war on terrorism, as the truism 
goes, means fighting a technique and it can never be 
won.  Instead, declare that some objectives have been 
reached and try  to return to normalcy  plus—not exactly 
how the US operated in 1999 or 2000 but how it should 
have been acting in a world where terrorism exists but 
causes far less damage than economic crises, climate 
change, domestic gun crimes, and all the rest.
Partly  as a consequence of  the “ending of  the war on 
terrorism,” the US could pivot not just towards Asia and 
the Pacific but away  from the Middle East.  Hard to do, 
but South America, Africa, Southeast  Asia have promises 
and challenges of  their own and some assistance could 
make a difference.  Again, the Middle East is the land of 
bad policy  choices, and it is no fun to keep having to 
figure out  which option is the least bad one.  Not that 
these other places are perfect,  but they have been on 
the back, back burner for too long. 
Obama should resolve to focus on Mexico as the most 
important foreign policy  priority.  The US has bet 
hundreds of  billions of  dollars and thousands of lives 
on far distant failed states. How about the very  violent 
country  next door for which the US bears considerable 
responsibility, with its thirst for drugs and its excess of 
guns?
The question is always raised during an election: who 
would want  this job, that  comes with such baggage?  The 
US Presidency  is a very  tough role, with the greatest 
latitude in foreign policy.  Obama’s first post-election trip 
to Burma, Cambodia and Thailand was promising, 
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